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In the Preface to Infancy and History, Giorgio Agamben insists that all
of his work has been oriented by a single question: “what is the mean-
ing of ‘there is language’” (Agamben 1978: 5)? This question is im-
portantly different from the kinds we typically associate with the
sciences of linguistics, communication theory, and information the-
ory. Agamben is not interested primarily in questions concerning how
signifiers are related to their signifieds or how messages are trans-
mitted across channels of communication from senders to receivers.
These, of course, are important questions, but all of them presuppose
something more basic that lies beyond the reach of the sciences. What
is presupposed is that which the linguist Jean-Claude Milner calls the
factum loquendi, or the brute fact that there is language and that there
are speaking beings at all (Milner 1989: 44; Agamben 1999: 66). Phi-
losophy, according to Agamben, is the attempt to understand the
meaning of this fact (Agamben 1999: 66–67). 
The meaning Agamben discovers in the factum loquendi grounds
some important and substantive ethical and political commitments.
What I want to argue in this paper, though, is that some of these com-
mitments do not follow from his premises. I want to focus specifically
on Agamben’s discussion of dignity in his 1998 book Remnants of
Auschwitz, where he argues that “Auschwitz marks the end and the
ruin of every ethics of dignity” (Agamben 1998: 69; 64). I believe that
Agamben’s own positions on what he calls communicability, or
being-in-language, actually support an ethically fruitful conception
of dignity. In what follows, then, I will begin with an account of those
aspects of Agamben’s philosophy of language that are especially rel-
evant for his argument about dignity. Next, I will examine the argu-
ment about dignity in some detail. Finally, I will show how the
phenomenon of communicability reveals an excess of sense over sig-
nification that singularizes the referents signified in language. It is
this singularization, I argue, that can provide the basis for a philo-
sophically adequate conception of dignity.
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Phone and Logos
In his early works, and most prominently in Infancy and History and
Language and Death, Agamben argues that Western metaphysics is
structured by a conception of language that takes as basic the dis-
junction of phone and logos, the natural voice and linguistic meaning.
This disjunction, and its ethico-political import, is marked clearly in
Aristotle’s Politics: 
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any
other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say,
makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who has the
gift of speech [logos]. And whereas mere voice is but an indica-
tion of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other ani-
mals…the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient
and the inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the un-
just. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense
of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the associ-
ation of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a
state. (Aristotle c.350 BC: 1253a7–19)
Phone here is the name for what we might call the natural, pre-
cultural voice, analogous to the cricket’s chirp or the dog’s bark. Aris-
totle’s point is that we enter into a world of specifically human
meaning only by leaving behind the immediacy of mere voice and en-
tering into logos, or articulated voice. This transition opens up an un-
bridgeable gap right at the heart of human experience: to be a human
being is to be zoon logon echon, the animal that has logos. The animal
who speaks is a living, natural, psychosomatic individual; it is the one
that the speaking subject means to refer to when she uses the first per-
son singular pronoun. But the natural, supposedly pre-linguistic I, im-
mediately present to itself in voice, is unsayable in logos, which is
mediation through and through. This is exactly the point that Hegel
argued for in the “Sense-Certainty” chapter of his Phenomenology of
Spirit. When I say “I”, I intend the I that is present immediately and
in its full concreteness in sensory experience: I mean to refer to this I.
But I cannot say this immediately given I because “I” is a universal,
any I at all. This is the unbridgeable gap at the heart of the human
being who has entered into language: “we do not strictly say what in
this sense-certainty we mean to say, and since the universal is the true
[content] of sense-certainty and language expresses this true [content]
alone, it is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a
sensuous being that we mean” (Hegel 1807: 60). Linguistic meaning,
on this account, is only possible on the basis of the negation of natural,
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supposedly pre-linguistic immediacy. This natural immediacy is pres-
ent within the world of linguistic meaning precisely as what neces-
sarily remains beyond its reach. The speaking subject, then, is
necessarily a subject divided from herself: to be in language is to ex-
perience right at the heart of our meaningful being-in-the-world an
unsayable, enigmatic something that forever eludes our grasp. 
Agamben believes that this linguistic and metaphysical concep-
tion of natural life as originarily divided from itself has constituted a
theoretical error and a political disaster. I will describe his arguments
for these two points in turn. First, Agamben believes that the charac-
terization of linguistic meaning as grounded in the negation of natu-
ral voice is descriptively inaccurate. On Hegel’s account, “the
unexpressed thing is an irrational thing; the rational exists only as
language”, which expresses the universal, the signification of the
thing (Hegel 1840: 457). Agamben disagrees, invoking an experience
of language that cannot be understood in terms of the closely related
dualisms of mediated-immediate, expressible-ineffable, and rational-
irrational. He refers in this connection to the eleventh century
philosopher Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, who describes an experience
of voice that is an experience neither of mediated, universal signifi-
cation nor of logically insignificant sound, but rather of something
intermediate between the two. This is the experience we have when
we hear a word whose signification we do not know. What is most
salient in this experience is that language does not successfully ex-
press the universal. Of course the word that is unknown to me is
known to others, who would experience it as successfully expressing
the universal. But this consideration is irrelevant to Gaunilo’s and
Agamben’s point, which is to describe a genuine lived experience
that is possible for anyone who has entered into language. Certainly
all of us have heard words whose significations we did not under-
stand. What Gaunilo emphasizes is that when this happens, we do
not experience the sound we hear as an irrational, inexpressible some-
thing that exists somewhere beyond the grasp of signification. Our
experience of the voice is an experience not of nonsense, but of po-
tential sense: we hear the voice as expressing a meaning that is not
known but that is nonetheless knowable (Gaunilo 1078: 149; Agam-
ben 1982: 34). Or in Agamben’s terms, we do not encounter an idea
that has been successfully communicated, but rather communicabil-
ity as such, the pure intention to signify that does not yet signify any-
thing in particular. In this experience, we encounter phone not as the
ineffable animal voice whose negation is the condition of possibility
for language, but rather as pure potentiality for sense.
43. “Communication and Communicability” ¶ Bryan Lueck
— 513 —
The idea of an originary division of life from itself constitutes a
political disaster, according to Agamben, because it grounds the biopo-
litical logic of sovereignty. Drawing once again on Aristotle’s Politics,
Agamben argues that the specifically political life presupposes a dis-
tinction between zoe, which is “the simple fact of living common to all
living beings”, and bios, which names a qualified life, “the form or way
of living proper to an individual or a group” (Agamben 1995: 1). Aris-
totle states this point explicitly in the Politics: the “state exists for the
sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only” (Aristotle c.350 BC:
1280a31). The institution tasked with securing the conditions for the
continuation of natural life is the household; the political state, on the
other hand, exists in order to create the conditions for the flourishing
of a specific kind of life. Aristotle develops this point in the Nicomachean
Ethics, where he argues that “the end of political science is the best, and
political science spends most of its pains on making the citizens to be
of a certain character, viz. good and capable of noble acts (Aristotle c.
350 BCa: 1090b30–33). The law-governed political community is con-
stituted through the exclusion of natural life in much the same way
that logos has been thought to be constituted through the exclusion of
phone. As Carl Schmitt argued in Political Theology, the legal order
makes sense only within the context of a “normal situation”, charac-
terized by a relatively stable condition of social organization: “there
exists no norm that is applicable to chaos” (Schmitt 1922: 13). In other
words, when social order breaks down to a sufficient degree, the law
loses its vis obligandi; people simply ignore it. Unordered social life is
thus outside the reach of law. But as Schmitt himself recognized, the
topology of the relation between the legal order and non-political life
is somewhat more complex. Just as on Hegel’s account the supposedly
immediate, sensuous given is posited within language as what neces-
sarily remains outside language, so the legal order includes supposedly
natural, non-political life within its purview precisely by positing it as
outside. This inclusion-by-exclusion is made possible by the fact that
the question whether the normal situation exists, and thus whether the
law applies, is always open. For the sake of the persistence of the legal
order, there must be some person who is authorized to give a decisive
answer to that question. That person is the sovereign, according to Carl
Schmitt’s well known definition (Schmitt 1922: 13). If the sovereign de-
cides that the normal situation does not exist, or that it is in danger of
no longer existing, then he is empowered by law to suspend the law
in order to recreate a normal situation. In this condition of the suspen-
sion of law, which is called the state of exception, the sovereign engages
directly with the very non-political life whose exclusion constitutes the
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legal order. He imposes order on that life by force, which is not the
brute, apolitical force of the kind hypothesized in the state of nature,
but rather the force of law. Agamben’s thesis is that the state of excep-
tion, where the law directly addresses the natural life that it excludes
from the political realm, has become the norm. Under conditions of the
generalized state of exception, the distinction between rule and fact
collapses: law is indistinguishable from its force. The paradigmatic
locus of the state of exception, according to Agamben, is the concen-
tration camp, where the law applies to the prisoners precisely as sus-
pended, as a pure force that is legally sanctioned.
Respecting Dignity as Duty to Oneself and as Duty to Others
What becomes manifest in the generalized state of exception, and es-
pecially in the concentration camp, according to Agamben, is the use-
lessness of many of our traditional ethical ideas. In Remnants of
Auschwitz, Agamben focuses specifically on the idea of dignity,
which, like many of our ethical concepts, had its origin in the world
of law. In ancient Rome, dignitas referred to “the rank and authority
that inhere in public duties as well as, by extension, those duties
themselves” (Agamben 1998: 66). Those who had dignity in this legal
sense of the term were entitled to various forms of respect, which
were codified in the law. They were also expected to conduct them-
selves in a manner that would render them worthy of that respect.
Indeed, the law excluded from dignitas those who were unlikely to
live up to that standard: in the Codex Justinianus we read that “the
doors to a title will be open neither to the infamous nor to the disrep-
utable, nor to those who are defiled by crime or turpitude of life, nor
to those whom infamy segregates from the association of men of
honor” (Justinian 534: 12.1.2). When the idea of dignity was intro-
duced into moral philosophy, it retained its sense as source of respect
and as an ideal one had to live up to, but lost its connection to political
position. All human beings were obligated to conduct themselves in
a manner worthy of respect, just as if they held positions of public
authority (Agamben 1998: 67–68). 
In the concentration camps, where the distinction between fact
and norm is collapsed and where power takes hold of bodies at the
level of bare life, this specifically moral conception of dignity appears
ridiculous. Agamben suggests a thought experiment to help illustrate
the point. He asks us to imagine a case in which the SS allows a
preacher to enter the camp, where he uses his opportunity to lecture
to the prisoners about the moral necessity of maintaining their dig-
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nity and self-respect. It is obviously the case, Agamben thinks, that
“the preacher’s gesture would be odious; his sermon would be an
atrocious jest in the face of those who were beyond not only the pos-
sibility of persuasion, but even of all human help” (Agamben 1998:
63). Agamben is clearly right here. But this is where I want to press
on Agamben’s account: why, precisely, would the preacher’s lecture
be odious? What is morally problematic about it? The wrongness can-
not consist simply in the infelicitousness of the exhortation. It would
be infelicitous to exhort a cat to act with dignity, since a cat is, in
Agamben’s words, beyond the possibility of persuasion. Exhorting
the cat would not be odious, though; it would merely be strange. What
I want to suggest is that the odiousness of lecturing the prisoners at
Auschwitz would consist precisely in the fact that doing so would fail
to respect their dignity. To exhort them to do what is almost certainly
beyond their power to do would be to gratuitously add insult to their
already extreme injury. If this interpretation of the odiousness of the
imagined lecture is correct, then Agamben’s claim that Auschwitz
marks the ruin of the ethics of dignity must be mistaken. 
If Agamben does not recognize a role for the idea of dignity in
our ethical reflection on Auschwitz and on the contemporary world
more generally, this, I want to argue, is because he focuses exclusively
on dignity as a property that the moral agent ought to respect in him-
or herself. But of course this is not the only context in which dignity
is morally relevant. For the moral tradition to which Agamben is re-
sponding it is at least as important to respect the dignity of others.
We can see this clearly in the work of Immanuel Kant, whose Ground-
work of the Metaphysics of Morals is the source for almost all modern
moral reflection on dignity. Kant presents the second formulation of
the categorical imperative—typically referred to as the Formula of
Humanity as End in Itself—as follows: “So act that you use humanity,
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same
time as an end, never merely as a means” (Kant 1785: 4:429). To treat a
person, oneself or another, as an end in him- or herself is to respect
that person’s dignity. In Kant’s moral philosophy, dignity names a
value that is understood in opposition to price: “What has a price can
be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other
hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent
has a dignity” (Kant 1785: 4: 434). Persons, according to Kant, have
both price and dignity. A shortstop, for example, has a price insofar
as he has a value that can be assessed with reference to a particular
end—winning baseball games—and in comparison with other short-
stops, who contribute better or worse to the same end. But in addition
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each of us has a value that exceeds price; even if a person’s value rel-
ative to particular ends and in comparison with others is extremely
low, he or she still has a kind of value that ought to be respected. As
bearer of dignity, the person is absolutely singular; his or her value
is incomparable and unexchangeable. As the Formula of Humanity
as End in Itself states explicitly, we all have a duty to respect the dig-
nity in our own persons. For Kant, this means we must take great
care not to debase ourselves through the vices of gluttony and drunk-
enness or by making ourselves lackeys. And we must not treat our-
selves merely as means, such as by allowing ourselves to be used for
the sexual pleasure of others or by selling our hair. In performing
these sorts of acts, we fall short of the norm given by our own hu-
manity (Kant 1797: 6:436; 6: 423–429). Is it reasonable for the imagined
preacher to insist that the prisoners at Auschwitz satisfy their obli-
gations to themselves to respect their own dignity? No. The whole
mechanism of the camp was designed to deprive them of the ability
to do that. But does it follow from this that the prisoners had no dig-
nity that ought to have been respected by others? The answer is ob-
viously no. Even the so-called Muselmänner, whose condition in the
camp was the very worst and whose price was probably zero, or even
less than zero, ought to have been treated with dignity. This, again,
is why the preacher’s lecture is odious: in insisting that the prisoners
do what is manifestly impossible for them to do, he treats them, in-
tentionally or not, with gratuitous cruelty.
Communicability and Singularity
What I want to argue in this final section is that Agamben’s own com-
mitments in philosophy of language can ground a conception of dig-
nity that would make sense of our intuitions in the imagined case of
the preacher at Auschwitz. Given limitations of space, I will not be
able to develop all of the aspects of dignity that I believe can be drawn
from Agamben’s account. In what follows, I will focus specifically on
the experience of singularity. I will argue that, on Agamben’s own
terms, our being-in-language sets us into relation with beings whose
sense exceeds the sum of the properties that can be truly predicated
of them, and which are thus given as something more than cases
falling under a general rule. It is this something more that we ought
to remain appropriately responsive to in our dealings with others.
To show how dignity is grounded in our being-in-language, I
would like to focus on the argument Agamben presents in Chapter
27 of The Coming Community. The argument concerns what medieval
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logicians called the paradox of cognitive being. On the one hand, the
idea through which a thing is known cannot be other than the thing
known. If it were, then we would not be able to know the thing
through the idea. If the idea “human being”, for example, were a con-
cept, understood as an object in the world alongside the human be-
ings to which it referred, then the idea “human being” would provide
us with no knowledge of human beings. The idea could not express
the truth of human beings because it would simply be another object
in the world. On the other hand, the idea cannot be the same as the
thing known because once again it would yield no knowledge of the
thing. For example, if the idea “human being” were exactly the same
thing as an individual human being, then the idea would be super-
fluous and thus useless for knowledge. This dichotomy seems to ex-
haust the alternatives: either the idea is other than the thing of which
it is the idea or it is the same. In neither case can we account for how
the idea expresses the thing (Agamben 1990: 74).
The solution to this paradox, Agamben thinks, lies in a passage
from Aristotle’s Metaphysics: “According to their participation, the
plurality of synonyms is homonymous with respect to ideas” (Aris-
totle c.350 BCb: 987b10). Synonyms for Aristotle are beings that be-
long to the same class through participation in a common concept.
They have the same name as well as the same definition. All individ-
ual human beings, for example, are synonyms insofar as they belong
to the class of human beings. Qua synonyms, then, human beings are
instances of the same kind. They are human beings in the sense that
“human being” expresses what they are in truth. Homonyms, on the
other hand, are beings that have the same name but different defini-
tions. So, individual human beings are synonymous with each other,
but they are homonymous with the idea “human being”. Human
being and “human being”, in other words, have the same name with-
out being the same kind of things: it is not the case that human being
and “human being” are both instances of the idea “human being”.
This, of course, is because “human being” is itself the idea; it is not
an instance of itself. Ideas must be different from the individuals that
instantiate them because otherwise they would yield no knowledge
of the individuals. 
How, precisely, ought we to understand this idea to which the
synonyms stand in a relation of homonymy? The most common in-
terpretation treats the idea as the universal. But this interpretation
cannot be correct, on Agamben’s view at least, because it returns us
to the Hegelian problematic that Agamben is so concerned to reject.
Specifically, it posits an unbridgeable gap right at the heart of the zoon
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logon echon: again, “when I say ‘I,’ I mean myself, this individual sep-
arated from all others…. ‘I’ is an absolute expression which excludes
every other ‘I,’ but everyone says ‘I’ of himself, for everyone is an
‘I’…. The individual also is thus the universal only, for in the word
as an existence born of the mind, the individual, if it is meant, cannot
find a place, since only the universal is expressed” (Hegel 1840: 466–
467). Instead of understanding the idea as the universal, Agamben
thinks we ought to understand it as the thing itself. The phrase “thing
itself” here is not a pleonasm; the “itself” names the manifestness of
the thing as the thing it is. Importantly, itselfness is not a property
that can be predicated of the thing in the way that universals like
“human being” or “tall” or “left-handed” can be predicated; itselfness
is not a general kind of which individual things are instances. The re-
lation of homonymy, then, “draws singularity from its synonymy,
from its belonging to a class” (Agamben 1990: 76). Qua homonyms,
human beings are something more than instances falling under the
genus “human being”. This something more, which is not a universal
“something more” of which individual somethings more would be
instantiations, is the sense that exceeds the homonyms’ significations.
They are singular beings whose manifestness is irreducible to any
predicate, and even to the totality of predicates that can be truly at-
tributed to them.
The being itself of the thing—its homonymy—is a function of its
being-in-language. Agamben expresses this point beautifully in his
essay “Bartleby, or On Contingency”, where he characterizes lan-
guage as “the angel of the phenomenon” (Agamben 1999: 257). The
angel (from the Greek aggelos, messenger) is the one “who simply car-
ries a message without adding anything, or who performatively an-
nounces an event …” (Agamben 1999: 257). The function of the
linguistic sign, according to Agamben, is not exhausted in its present-
ing the signification of things, of predicating universals of them and
thereby presenting them in their truth. More basically than this, the
function of the linguistic sign is presentation simpliciter, without qual-
ification: it gives “the intimation of Being without any predicate”
(Agamben 1999: 257). The manifestness of the thing, or in Agamben’s
terms its being itself, constitutes a dimension of sense that is irre-
ducible to its significations. No matter how many universals we
might find to truly predicate of the thing, those universals will never
exhaust the thing’s being. Being itself is not another property that can
be communicated in language as a signification, but is rather the
thing’s very communicability, its being manifest as something with
the potential to be said. 
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What I want to argue in conclusion is that the preacher in Agam-
ben’s example from Remnants of Auschwitz goes wrong precisely in
treating the prisoners simply as cases falling under the genus “human
being”, overlooking the communicability that exceeds that significa-
tion. He treats their humanity as their truth and as the ideal to which
their lives ought to conform. From a certain point of view, it seems
obviously correct to say that their dignity as human beings consists
in living up to that ideal. But it seems obviously incorrect to say that
of the prisoners at Auschwitz. They have been degraded to the point
where it is practically impossible for them to live up to a certain stan-
dard of autonomy and self-respect. Indeed, the term used by the
Nazis to designate the legal status of the Jews during the twelve year
state of exception of the Third Reich was entwürdigt, deprived of dig-
nity. In the eyes of the law, Jews were bare life, falling below the dig-
nity of qualitatively human life. And yet they retained a dignity that
others ought to have respected, even in the camps. This is because
the prisoners at Auschwitz were more than members of the class
“human being;” they were human beings themselveswhose value was
incommensurable, irreducible to the value corresponding to the kinds
of beings they were. They were singular, with a sense that exceeded
what could be truly predicated of them. If this is correct, then it is a
mistake to think of Auschwitz as effecting the ruin of the ethics of
dignity. As Agamben’s own thought experiment suggests, Auschwitz
reveals rather the indispensability of such an ethics.
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